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A Reform That’s No Shame: Ten Years with a 
Currency Board in Your Pocket 
 
If some ten years ago we had talked about things such as “a 
currency board,” “a pegged litas” or “an anchor currency,” the 
overall majority of people would have shrugged their shoulders 
wondering. Today it is not a mistake to say that nearly everyone is 
aware of this monetary system. But this awareness did not come 
along just because people had taken special interest in it or 
because the idea of pegging the national currency - litas - had been 
actively propagated.  
 
People in Lithuania are familiar with the currency board system 
because they have tested and experience it with their pockets. 
Being able to draw a fixed amount of the anchor currency for litas 
and vice versa at any time they needed and with no impediments, 
people have made friends with this simple and companionable 
system. More than that, they have not only tried it themselves but 
also have shaped a firm opinion about this monetary-policy 
regime.  
 
If we were to rephrase a well-known expression, it would run like 
this: eliminate the currency board and you will realize how 
immensely significant it is for the people and the economy. This is 
all very true of Lithuania: politicians have encroached on a host of 
things good to people, but they have not ventured to dismantle this 
system and don’t dare to do so today. At the moment, virtually no 
one doubts that this system will be preserved until the launch of 
the euro in Lithuania. And who can scrap the possibility that the 
European Central Bank who is contemplating serious change 
won’t introduce certain elements of the currency board one day 
either. 
 
On April 1, 2004 the currency board system in Lithuania marked 
its ten-year anniversary. It was launched by adopting the Law on 
Litas Credibility which tied the litas to a strong foreign currency at 
a fixed exchange rate. However, the fixed exchange rate is not the 
keystone feature of the currency board. The underpinning of this 
arrangement is a 100 percent reserve backing which ensures that 
every litas in circulation is freely convertible into foreign 
currency. At the start the anchor currency was the U.S. dollar, and 
on February 2, 2002 the litas was re-pegged to the euro. The 
reserve currency has been replaced but the system has remained in 
place. It is a system where a central bank’s major task is to 
maintain foreign reserves, while the remainder of monetary policy 
is run automatically.  
 
It was precisely this system’s automatism that stirred hostility of 
its opponents, the partisans of an active monetary policy. These 
were really many in number - interest groups who sought to exert 
influence on the exchange rate of the litas and gain from that, 
politicians or bureaucrats who wanted ease-come litas into the 
budget, or academicians who believed sacredly that an individual 
at the helm of money can perform the mission much better than 
the flawless market would. There is no point in disputing with the 
former and the existing opponents today. Those who didn’t trust 
the system have found answers to their questions in the ten-year 
history. Once foreshadowed, the bugaboos have not emerged. All 
the actively championed advantages of the currency board turned 
into reality: inflation was curbed, political discretionary powers 
were eliminated, the economy gained long-term stability, and 
money became the people’s, not the government’s, property. 
Lithuanians do not fear to join the EU’s monetary system as they 
are actually already a part of it.  
 
But the struggle was intense and fierce in the past. If to look at the 
history of ten to eleven years, it nevertheless seems incredible that 
confronting colossal resistance the architects of the currency board 
managed to install this system. The adoption of the currency 
board, make no mistake, has been the most steadfast reform ever 
effected in Lithuania. The Bank of Lithuania, who once stood 
firmly against its introduction, currently enjoys top ratings 
according to opinion polls. But it is not the ratings that matter. The 
pre-eminent thing about this reform is that it is no shame today.  
 
*** 
This issue of “The Free Market” is dedicated to mark the ten-year 
anniversary of the currency board system in Lithuania. It presents 
the outlook and evaluation of people who took an active part in the 
launching of this system ten years ago – both arduous prophets and 
fervent opponents of this idea. Let us take a look at the picture of 
the reform after ten years… 
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Adolfas Slezevicius led the sixth government from 1993 until 
1996. His cabinet proposed and implemented the adoption of a 
currency board system, by far the most successful economic 
reform in Lithuania. Mr. Slezevicius agreed to share his 
memories of the turbulent history of adopting a currency board 
in Lithuania, a history we can celebrate today thanks to the 
titanic efforts of the sixth administration and its supporters. 
 
 
Reform Was Hard To Accomplish But I Would 
Do It Again 
Interview with ex-Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius 
 
 
Only a few countries in the world have a currency board 
arrangement. How did you discover it and how did you 
come to learn more about it? 
 
Indeed, very few countries in the world opt for a currency 
board model, but that does mean it is ineffective. Currency 
board arrangements, with certain specific nuances, have existed 
in more than 70 countries during different periods. Virtually all 
of these countries have gained very positive outcomes from 
such a rigid monetary policy such as stabilizing the exchange 
rate, curbing inflation and stimulating economic growth. 
 
I first learned about the currency board regime when it was 
being implemented in Estonia. At that time Estonia had 
achieved the highest rate of economic growth and stability as 
compared with other former Soviet nations. Equally attractive 
was the history of adopting a currency board in Argentina. In 
this country a currency board system was implemented after a 
severe bout of hyperinflation and as a result it helped to bring 
down inflation and achieve positive economic growth in a very 
short time.  
 
These successful examples from Estonia and Argentina led us, 
in the light of the instability of the national currency, to learn 
more about the specifics of applying and operating this peculiar 
monetary policy arrangement. The interest in the currency 
board increased when the policy pursued by the Bank of 
Lithuania began to drive into despair not only the government 
but also business entities. 
 
When talks about the possibilities of introducing a currency 
board in Lithuania began, Professor S. Hanke from the United 
States visited Lithuania several times to provide advice to the 
government of Lithuania. It was him who gave us an 
abundance of information about the advantages of the currency 
board and about other countries’ experience in implementing it. 
We also obtained much information from representatives of the 
International Monetary Fund, first of all Mr. Knobl and Mr. P. 
Cornelius. IMF strongly supported the government’s position 
in all stages of implementing the currency board. 
 
I would like to particularly emphasise LFMI president Elena 
Leontjeva’s role in advocating the currency board in our 
country. She personally and the Lithuanian Free Market 
Institute were very important aids of the government in 
promoting the idea of a currency board in Lithuania. 
 
When and in what circumstances did you comprehend that 
a currency board system would be suitable for Lithuania? 
What led you to take a strong decision in favour of this 
model? 
There were several factors that favoured the final decision of 
the government. First of all let me note that the currency board 
arrangement was implemented in Lithuania in very 
complicated economic and political conditions. The sixth 
administration, which took office at the beginning of 1993, 
inherited a particularly deplorable economic legacy. At that 
time the average wage in national currency was 27 U.S. 
dollars, while the average pension was 9 U.S. dollars. And this 
negligible income lost much of its value every day in the 
conditions of hyperinflation which stood at 1,263 percent in 
1992! According to the World Bank, only Armenia and 
Georgia out of 26 post-communist states suffered from higher 
inflation that year. But apart from the economic turmoil, these 
countries were also being shattered by civic war. 
 
Our country’s indebtedness to Russian companies for gas and 
nuclear fuel amounted to almost 100 million U.S. dollars. 
Apartments were faintly heated and had no hot water; petrol 
stations had no fuel; stores had no foodstuffs. The society was 
plunged in enormous social tension and hostility. Pickets and 
other disobedience actions were held in front of the 
government building almost every day. Political opponents 
sought to impede at every cost the economic reforms we 
pursued. So the ground for all types of economic speculations 
and public intimidation was particularly fertile. But the history 
of adopting the currency board had not even started then. 
 
At that time the introduction of the national currency was the 
first priority. Thanks to the efforts of the Bank of Lithuania, 
this was accomplished during a very short period of time, 
during three months after the new administration and the new 
leadership of the Bank of Lithuania took office. We were the 
last of the Baltic States to introduce national currency, just like 
many other important economic reforms by the way. For this 
reason almost all micro- and macroeconomic indicators in our 
country were the worst of all Baltic States. It took us two or 
three years to catch up. Today Lithuania is more and more 
often labelled as “the Baltic tiger” and the leader of economic 
development in the region. There is no doubt that the currency 
board has played no small part in this success story. 
 
Let me mention that hyperinflation was overcome with the 
introduction of the national currency. When the national 
currency was adopted in July 1993, the monthly inflation was a 
mere 0.7 percent, down from over 25 percent in April. Fragile 
foundations for economic growth were laid down. However, 
numerous monetary policy restrictions for business and 
individuals remained. Companies had much difficulty in 
buying and selling foreign currency. The exchange rate of 
foreign currencies against the litas swung heavily. The 
Lithuanian Industrialists Confederation and other business 
associations kept blaming the government for ruining 
companies and businesses. As you may know, the government 
had no powers or instruments to conduct monetary policy. By 
the estimates of the Lithuanian Industrialists Confederation, 
swings in the exchange rates of the litas and foreign currencies 
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cost industrial companies a loss of 350 to 400 million litas of 
profits only in 1993. In the economic conditions of those days 
such losses were particularly painful. Naturally, this money did 
not just disappear. First of all it went to commercial banks. 
 
It was obvious that the Bank of Lithuania and commercial 
banks were not satisfied with the situation. Calls from the 
government to bring order in this area were ignored. At that 
time the governor of the Bank of Lithuania increasingly 
demonstrated his wish to engage more in politics and 
commerce than in monetary policy. The notorious credit of 20 
million litas extended by the Bank of Lithuania to “theirs” 
Litimpex Bank and political activities Mr. Visokavicius later 
embarked on only confirmed our suspicions.  
 
These considerations led the government and first of all me 
personally as its leader and chair of the ruling party to initiate 
the removal of the governor of the Bank of Lithuania, Mr. 
Visokavicius, from office. My suspicions regarding his 
politicking proved correct very quickly. Shortly after his 
removal from the position of the governor of the Bank of 
Lithuania Mr. Visokavicius was at the forefront of the 
Conservative party’s congress. His banking and politicking 
career cost the Lithuanian economy dearly at that time. Of 
course, his removal was seen as political dealing with a decent 
banker who modestly called himself no less than “Litas’ 
father.” A question that kept bothering me and others at that 
time was how much inexperience and how much conscious 
harm-doing with regard to the-then government there was in 
the Bank of Lithuania’s actions. Maybe historians will answer 
this question some day… 
 
The persisting instability of the national currency only 
reinforced the government’s position on the need to adopt a 
currency board in our country. It became absolutely clear that 
only a monetary policy independent of biased leaders of the 
Bank of Lithuania and immune to political pressure could 
secure the stability of the national currency that was much 
needed by the Lithuanian economy and the people. The 
government had simply neither possibilities nor time to wait 
until, hopefully, the newly formed board of the Bank of 
Lithuania, led by newly appointed chair Mr. Ratkevicius, 
achieved the stability of the national currency.  
 
My meeting with Argentina’s economic minister D. Covallo 
during the 1994 World Economic Forum in Davos played an 
important role in the story of implementing a currency board in 
Lithuania. It was Mr. Covallo who was the main architect of 
very successful economic reforms, including the introduction 
of a currency board, in Argentina. Our long discussion revealed 
a host of aspects and benefits of having a currency board 
regime. This meeting dispelled any doubts regarding the need 
to adopt a currency board arrangement in Lithuania once and 
for all.  
 
True, the possibilities of applying a currency board model in 
our country were briefly discussed at the sitting of the Litas 
committee when the preparations for introducing the national 
currency took place. The-then governor of the Bank of 
Lithuania, Mr. Visokavicius, strongly opposed the application 
of this monetary policy model in Lithuania. He assured that the 
Bank of Lithuania would secure the stability of the national 
currency. At that time I lacked experience and information, so 
naturally I was not able to assume an adequate position 
concerning the implementation of a currency board Lithuania. 
But there was no need to adopt a currency board at that time 
either. After all, central banks successfully applied classical 
monetary policy around the world. Unfortunately, this policy 
failed to justify itself in Lithuania through the fault of the-then 
governor of the Bank of Lithuania. It took almost one year after 
the litas had been introduced to implement the Law on Litas 
Credibility, a law which served to stabilize the country’s 
economy and stimulate growth. 
 
It is natural that introducing novelties always raises various 
discussions and emotions. Who supported you and who 
opposed you the most when the currency board system was 
being introduced? Can you tell us a little bit more about 
how responsible institutions and persons changed their 
attitudes in supporting or opposing this idea? 
 
The introduction of a currency board in Lithuania required 
tremendous efforts from the government and, first of all, from 
me personally as its leader. During three years of heading the 
government I could not recall a single law that faced such a 
large resistance. 
 
Commercial banks were the biggest opponents of this law. And 
this resistance was easy to explain. There is no easier way for 
commercial banks to earn money than in the conditions of 
unstable currency and inflation. Commercial banks used every 
possible means to influence the government’s views on the 
adoption of a currency board in Lithuania. There were 
collective statements from commercial banks. Help was 
solicited from individual politicians and economists. In the last 
phase of adopting the law efforts were made, quite fruitfully, to 
influence even President of the Republic of Lithuania A. 
Brazauskas. 
 
The press and other media teemed with various articles and 
opinions about the likely disastrous consequences of the 
currency board not only for Lithuania but for its statehood. The 
circle of the opponents was not narrow. It comprised such 
economists as Mr. Uosis, Mr. Terleckas, Ms. Visokaviciene 
and others plus politicians with various views and outlooks. 
Famous energetic dissident Mr. Terleckas was also at the 
forefront of the opposition.  
 
There were even a few cabinet ministers who doubted the 
necessity to submit the Law on Litas Credibility to the 
parliament. These were economic minister Mr. Veselka and 
foreign affairs minister Mr. Gilys. Mr. Veselka’s position was 
more understandable: he was always an oppositionist, 
sometimes even against himself. It was always interesting to 
listen to the proposals he presented to the government. 
Sometimes he managed to oppose even his own proposals, 
motivating that he had changed his opinion. But I could not 
understand economic professor foreign affairs minister Mr. 
Gilys. It seemed to me that a minister with good economic 
knowledge had to be the first to comprehend how inevitable 
and necessary this decision was in implementing the 
government’s agenda. Obviously, commercial banks did not 
miss the opportunity to take advantage of the aforesaid 
ministers’ position in order to exert pressure on other members 
of the cabinet. I am glad that these ministers remained a 
minority on this issue. 
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President Brazauskas’ position was also very important in 
gaining passage for the Law on Litas Credibility. Let me note 
that President Brazauskas upheld the government almost until 
the adoption of the law. However, on the eve of the adoption 
commercial banks tried for the last time to change the 
government’s position. At the initiative of president’s advisor 
academician Mr. Rajeckas a large council was called. The 
participants included for the most part heads of commercial 
banks as well as governor of the Bank of Lithuania Mr. 
Ratkevicius, finance minister Mr. Vilkelis, leaders of the 
parliamentary faction of the Lithuanian Labour Democratic 
Party (LLDP) Mr. Karosas and Mr. Kirkilas, chairman of the 
parliamentary budge and finance committee Mr. Kolosauskas, 
chairman of the Economic Crime Investigation Commission 
Mr. Juskus, LFMI’s president Ms. Leontjeva and others.   
 
At the very beginning of the council I realized that the 
president had, to put it mildly, changed his opinion on the Law 
on Litas Credibility (many years of affiliation with the 
president made it easy for me to notice the change). I realized 
that heads of commercial banks had done their best. A hard 
conversation was in store.  
 
And then the principle of the last source of information 
worked. The president was easily persuaded and could easily 
change his opinion, even on fundamental issues, drawing on 
the information he obtained last. I witnessed this yet another 
time at the end of my political career when the president 
changed radically his position concerning my removal from the 
position of the prime minister during one hour only. But this is 
another story…. 
 
So the president offered me to start. I said that it would be 
better if all members of the council spoke first. The 
composition of the audience determined the contents of the 
speeches. Most of the participants strongly opposed the 
adoption of a currency board arrangement in Lithuania. They 
repeated all of the traditional intimidations about the inevitable 
disasters that the currency board would bring if the law were 
adopted. Only LFMI’s president Ms. Leontjeva and Mr. 
Kolosauskas and Mr. Juskus upheld the idea. The latter MPs 
had visited Estonia to familiarise themselves with the 
functioning of the currency board and thus became keen 
advocates of this model. 
 
In the light of this absolute criticism of the Law on Litas 
Credibility even finance minister Vilkelis, who felt in which 
direction the president was steering the council, expressed 
some doubts. By the way, he was the last to speak so he could 
take a position that would suit any outcome. Mr. Vilkelis 
upheld the president’s idea that the adoption of the law had 
better be postponed for some time until there was more 
information on hand. I knew quite well that temporarily meant 
never. This would have meant abandoning the idea altogether. 
 
When the president realized that the outcome of the council 
was clear, he cheerfully gave me the floor saying: “You see, 
Adolfas, the majority arguments are very convincing and we’d 
better refrain from adopting the law in parliament. Maybe we 
could come back to this question some day.” 
 
It was obvious that the government’s position had to be 
presented very clearly and categorically. I spoke very briefly: 
“Your Excellency. The government cannot secure economic 
stability in the conditions of such unpredictable swings in the 
exchange rate. Exchange rate fluctuations are only pumping 
money from the economy to commercial banks. By not being 
able to influence these processes, we are becoming their 
hostages. Therefore, the government cannot and will not 
change its decision to submit the Law on Litas Credibility for 
the third reading in parliament. If the parliament approves it [I 
already had the approval of the LLDP faction], you may refuse 
to sign it. If you do so, the government will resign. This will be 
a simple and civilized way out of this situation.” 
 
Obviously, the president and the majority in the audience did 
not expect a speech like this at all. The president did not 
anticipate such a turn and was evidently discontented. I could 
easily feel the president’s dissatisfaction. In such cases his 
blood pressure rose, his face flushing red. I felt that the 
president made a great effort not to criticize my position. But 
no more discussions followed. Although I used to stay on after 
any conversation to discuss with the president one issue or 
another, this time we all departed without further ado.  
 
The next day the parliament passed the Law on Litas 
Credibility. The president signed it and we never returned to 
this question again. But since then I have always wanted to ask 
the president who and in what circumstances had influenced 
him so that he was ready to decline the law. 
 
So this is the story how the Law on Litas Credibility came into 
being despite intense debates behind the scenes and open 
discussions, lobbying and vehement opposition.  Apart from 
other economic reform components, this law laid the 
foundations for the country’s economic stabilization (meriting 
the label of “the long stabilizer” among the reporters), 
economic growth and a rise in people’s real income.  
 
What in your opinion were the main motives of the 
opponents: interests or simply fear and a lack of 
determination? 
 
I am confident that interests were the main motive that 
determined the opponents’ fierce resistance to the Law on Litas 
Credibility. And these interests were very big. These were both 
economic and political interests and both powerful and 
concrete enough. 
 
Economic interests determined first of all the opposition on the 
part of the central bank and commercial banks. After all, a 
fixed exchange rate eliminated any possibilities to profit from 
swings in the exchange rate. I already mentioned the losses that 
economic entities incurred. These amounts did not disappear 
anywhere. They were redistributed from industry and other 
sectors for the benefit of commercial banks. This was the 
golden age of commercial banks. Hyperinflation, exchange rate 
fluctuations… How many famous “bankers” this period 
raised… Of course, these forces could not just take a neutral 
position and watch how the preparations for the introduction of 
the currency board proceeded. It was an out-and-out 
opposition. There were statements from bankers and 
commissioned articles with prophecies virtually about the end 
of the world if such a monetary policy model were adopted in 
Lithuania. Pressure was also exerted through individual 
members of the cabinet. 
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Political interests could not remain unexpressed either. After 
all, political opponents in most cases do not care about general 
interests of the state. The principle “the worse for the 
government, the better” is, unfortunately, the main motto for 
many politicians. I think that it was this principle that caused 
this fierce opposition to the adoption of the currency board. 
Many of them understood already then that this monetary 
policy would guarantee the growth of the economy and 
people’s real income. Naturally, that was not in line with the 
interests and plans of the-then opposition, whose major goal 
was to instil in people the idea that the parliamentary majority 
and its composed government were not capable of governing 
the state. But the thought of waiting until the next legislative 
elections was disconcerting for them.   
 
There were plenty of “troubadours” on the political barricades 
trumpeting about the collapse of the economy and even the 
state that the adoption of the Law on Litas Credibility would 
inevitably bring. 
 
Naturally, you were confronted with difficult tasks and 
puzzling questions. What was the most difficult: choosing 
the anchor currency, securing sufficient reserves, 
persuading opponents or anything else? 
 
Frankly speaking the most difficult job was to convince 
members of the LLDP faction in parliament that it was crucial 
to adopt the Law on Litas Credibility. It took hours and hours 
and hours. I solicited help from IMF representatives Mr. Knobl 
and Mr. Cornelius, LFMI’s president Ms. Leontjeva and other 
specialists. We took advice from currency board specialist S. 
Hanke. We organized various publications and presentation of 
the currency board in the media. MPs Kolosauskas and Juskus 
visited Estonia and familiarized themselves with the 
functioning of the currency board system. This facilitated 
dialogue with members of parliament.  
 
Of course, I am not talking now about political opponents and 
their committed economists. No arguments could suffice or 
convince them. They simply did not want the-then ruling 
majority, its government and the president to achieve positive 
changes in various areas of life, including the economy. The 
opposition followed faithfully the principle “the worse, the 
better.” 
 
In forming the Litas stabilization fund, we received tremendous 
help from IMF. Also, the repayment of Lithuania’s pre-war 
gold reserves by foreign countries, first of all France and 
England, did not come amiss.  
 
Why was the US dollar chosen as the anchor currency? 
After all, integration into the European Union was already 
being projected then. 
 
The choice was not difficult to make. Almost all hard currency 
reserves in the Bank of Lithuania were in US dollars. Almost 
all trade transactions of Lithuanian economic entities with 
foreign partners were in US dollars too. At that time the 
prospects of Lithuania’s full membership of the European 
Union in 2004 were very dim indeed. By the way, the 
introduction of the European currency, the euro, was only a 
plan then. As we all know, the euro as the common means of 
settlement in European countries was introduced only from the 
beginning of 2002. 
 
How was the exchange rate set? Did anyone profit (in the 
bad sense of the word) from fixing of the exchange rate? 
 
Fixing the exchange rate was not easy either. We held long and 
difficult negotiations with IMF, the Lithuanian Industrialists 
Confederation, commercial banks and other business 
associations. Industrialists wanted the litas-U.S. dollar 
exchange rate to be fixed at no less than 4.5 to 1 or 5 to 1. IMF 
credibly insisted that the exchange rate should be not higher 
than 3.2-3.5 to 1. After intense negotiations we reached not a 
bad compromise at all, to my mind. The litas-U.S. dollar 
exchange rate had remained 4 to 1 for almost six years until the 
litas was pegged to the euro. True, shortly afterwards the U.S. 
dollar depreciated markedly against the litas. Just for fun, 
remembering the saying of one Lithuanian political classicist, 
“who can deny” that the earlier strength of the dollar was not 
based on the strength of the litas… 
 
I don’t think that anyone profited from the fixing of the litas to 
the U.S. dollar. It was before the Law on Litas Credibility came 
into effect that profiting, large-scale profiting indeed, had taken 
place.  
 
The currency board system did not appear in Lithuania 
overnight. How long did it take to implement the system? 
 
Naturally an important decision like this could not have been 
adopted very quickly. Nevertheless, it took much longer than 
expected. It took no less than eight months from the promotion 
of the idea until the adoption of the Law on Litas Credibility in 
the parliament.  
 
Can you count how many times attempts were made to 
abandon the system? Would you count them with your one 
hand? 
 
There were many calls and intimidations to scrap the currency 
board model, but not a single political party in power dared to 
even start such a debate in the parliament. Argumentation on 
the part of individual politicians or industrialists could not be 
viewed as attempts to dismantle the system.  
 
Ten years have passed since the currency board 
arrangement was installed in Lithuania. Do you think the 
system has justified itself? Would you make the same 
decision once again, and in general is it hard to implement 
such sweeping reforms? 
 
It is my strong conviction that the very fact of celebrating the 
tenth anniversary of the currency board in Lithuania answers 
this question. This system has survived all parties which have 
been in power. I have already mentioned how strong the 
opposition was. It was claimed that this ostensibly disastrous 
monetary policy would end with the end of the LLDP tenure. 
During those ten years the opposition and other political parties 
had many occasions to abandon the currency board. However, 
no politician dared to even start debating this question, 
although there was constant pressure, especially from 
industrialists, to change the exchange rate of the national 
currency and the anchor currency. This confirms once again 
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that the currency board arrangement, which has been applied 
for ten years now, has fully justified itself.  
 
Reforms like this are indeed very difficult to implement. The 
government offered this decision although it was 
disadvantageous for the government itself. The government 
forewent the right to draw loans from the central bank, which 
lost the function of a lender of last resort. So this move 
required a great deal of political will on our part.  
 
However, if I had to take this decision once again, it would be 
the same because it was exceptionally important and necessary. 
And it has excellently served the common good. 
 
And what benefits has this system brought for people? 
 
I can see several gains. Apart from other elements of the 
economic reform, a strict monetary policy first of all helped to 
curb inflation, or price rises. To quote one classical economist, 
it is inflation that robs and impoverishes unnoticed the whole 
society. Curbing inflation laid the foundations for the rise of 
the economy and people’s real income. Higher pensions and 
wages and stable or slowly rising prices are the goals which all 
governments pursue, and societies count on their governments 
to achieve these goals.  
 
A strict monetary policy pursued in Lithuania since April 1, 
1994 has secured a rapid increase of gold and hard currency 
reserves. They grew almost 30 times only during the 
incomplete three-year tenure of the sixth administration! This 
laid the foundations for the long-term stability of the litas. And 
the winners of a stable national currency are first of all the 
people! 
 
Thank you very much 
   
 
 
*** 
 
 
 
Ms. Elena Leontjeva was one of the active champions of the 
currency board system in the pats decade. Under her 
leadership, the Lithuanian Free Market Institute has advocated 
the idea of the currency board, strongly supported its 
implementation and helped drafting the law on litas credibility. 
As numerous attempts were made to scrap this system, LFMI 
and its President stepped in every time in its defence. In the 
following interview Ms. Leontjeva shares her recollections and 
explains the reasons why this monetary system was needed in 
Lithuania. 
The Currency Board Helped Preserve Reliable 
and Shielded Money 
An interview with Elena Leontjeva, LFMI’s Chair of Board 
 
In 1993-1994, as the President of the Lithuanian Free 
Market Institute, you supported strenuously the idea of a 
currency board arrangement and contributed significantly 
to its implementation in Lithuania. Why, in your opinion, 
this particular monetary-policy regime was the right 
reform path at that time?   
 
After the trying ordeals of socialism, Lithuania has deliberately 
chosen the course of the free market, and money in such a 
market does not depend (or should not depend) on political or 
interest group pressure and has to serve people credibly in all 
its functions. In the past such money was gold and silver but it 
was abandoned gradually as people wanted to take the helm of 
money into their own hands. In those days Lithuania was 
contemplating an option to return to gold, but despite the fact 
that Lithuania had been under the gold standard until the USSR 
occupation, and certain sentiments to adopt this decision were 
felt, however, the circumstances were not pertinent to do so. 
The gold standard was no longer used anywhere else in the 
world, and this factor halted Lithuania (as would have done to 
any other small country) from reverting to it.  
 
Clearly, the alternatives we had were scanty – either a currency 
board or a discretionary monetary system. The currency board 
was not an ideal system but nonetheless it helped to iron out an 
array of the most daunting problems that people faced. The 
essential characteristics of a currency board arrangement are 
these: a fully convertible currency and free movement of 
capital; a 100 percent backing of national money with foreign 
reserves; a stable, not interventionist, exchange rate of 
currencies; money shielded from any type of political 
manipulation, “dilution” or artificial revaluation; market 
interest rates secured from interventions and other features. 
Evidently, the sole advantages of the currency board are related 
to safeguarding money from discretionary decisions of the 
government.  
 
The launching of the currency board system must have 
been a lengthy and complicated process, punctuated by 
furious resistance of its opponents. How the-then efforts 
seem after ten years? What events are embedded in your 
memory most conspicuously? 
 
I remember most vividly Pope John Paul II’s visit to Lithuania 
when the litas surged against foreign currencies twice (the 
reason was not heightened religious belief of course, but a 
restrictive policy of the Bank of Lithuania that curtailed the 
money supply). As a result of this policy, the country fell short 
of litas and the exchange rate of the national currency kept 
growing unremittingly. The business sector was paralysed, and 
it was impossible to envisage not only the yield on long-term 
investment but also the profitability of trade operations that last 
just for two weeks. All these disastrous effects were the result 
of the central bank’s vain efforts to “calm down” the national 
currency.  
 
The problem of money credibility and its protection from 
monetary authorities became as pressing in those days as never 
before. I took into account this issue and published an article in 
one of the leading national dailies, Respublika, describing a 
monetary system that could secure people from similar 
cataclysms. We had been debating this monetary-policy regime 
before the litas was launched in the country but everyone then 
seemed to be more concerned about having national money but 
less so about a mechanism of its issuance. Afterwards the idea 
of the currency board was introduced at the Economist club 
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and other audiences. Then followed the invitation by Prime 
Minister Mr. Adolfas Slezevicius to discuss this topic in more 
detail. Mr. Slezevicius appeared to be a vehement supporter of 
this idea, and I believe this acted as the first turning point in the 
history of launching the currency board in Lithuania. Shortly 
after that, the International Monetary Fund promised the 
Lithuanian Government to back the implementation of the 
currency board, and this was the second decisive factor to go 
along. The third crucial contributor to the process was when 
the parliamentary fraction of the Lithuanian Democratic 
Labour Party upheld this idea and later voted for the draft law 
on litas credibility. This party proved that they had cared for 
the interests of ordinary citizens rather than for retaining 
“monetary sovereignty” and printing money at will.  
 
I should add though that when I and the task force set up at the 
government were drafting the law on litas credibility people 
kept repeating to me that we were just wasting our time and 
that the interest groups will triumph at the critical moment and 
the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party would step back. As if 
on purpose, the exchange rate of the litas stabilised, generating 
a natural thought that the tribulations were over and that 
Lithuania was no longer in need of this law on litas credibility. 
The ranks of opponents were swelling but this fact is probably 
not essential today.  
 
As time went by, the number of supporters of this reliably 
operating system increased, and today no one would want to 
eliminate this system and no one prognosticates its “crumbling 
down.” I think that the currency board was criticized in those 
days not just because its economic and financial merits were 
vaguely perceived. It might be that people in Lithuania were 
simply dazzled by the regained independence and lacked 
understanding that what they had retrieved was their freedom 
from various rulers and that it was not the rulers’ boundless 
freedom to act as they please. Sadly, this principle was scarcely 
admitted into the realm of monetary authorities in Lithuania in 
those days. When people talk about problems that plaque 
Lithuanian society today, they usually point to those areas in 
which the principle of limited government has not found 
consistent and detailed expression. Take, for example, any 
sphere - land sales, construction permits, tax interpretation, etc. 
– all their ills take the same roots - the abuse of unconstrained 
power.  
 
Lithuanian exporters and importers faulted the currency 
board system for failing to hedging them against 
fluctuations in currency exchange rates which led them to 
lose the markets. Can these arguments be justified? 
 
This monetary-policy regime couldn’t have shielded them from 
fluctuations in exchange rates as such is not its purpose. It has 
safeguarded money from government and interest group 
intervention and has fulfilled this function without rebuke. 
There were at least several episodes in the history of the 
currency board when the government was tempted to solve 
problems by slipping its hand into the pockets of all of us. The 
said occasions were the crisis of the banking sector in 1995 and 
the break-up of the state finance system in 1999. In fact, 
inflation and devaluation have been (and remain) the constant 
phenomena of life in all of Central European countries that 
have no similar scheme. The exception is Latvia which has no 
safeguards set by law but the principles of the currency board 
are enshrined in the rules of Latvia’s central bank. As for 
exchanges rates - just imagine a situation in which our 
monetary-authorities try to please one and then the other 
interest group! The exchange rate would be leaping about at 
such frequency and amplitude that any stable exchange rate 
would seem salvation for people.  
 
I understand very well that the issue of fluctuations in 
exchange rates is very important, and often even grievous, for 
those working on the outside markets. But the exchange rate of 
the euro and the dollar would fluctuate anyway – whether the 
litas be pegged to either of these currencies or “unleashed” 
from any anchor (well, unless we believe seriously that the litas 
“props up” any anchor currency it is linked to). Fluctuations in 
currency exchange rates would remain a problem for 
Lithuanian companies all the same, only it would be 
accompanied by yet another day-to-day conundrum – the 
question of the exchange rate of the national currency to the 
dollar, the euro and all the rest of the world’s currencies.  
 
As money is the expression of all, it is human to cast the blame 
on it when things go wrong, although the dissatisfaction should 
be aimed at completely other targets. If income is lower than 
expenses, it’s not money to blame, even though money is used 
to express a result. It is true, there is one more aspect of such 
discontent. When currencies in the rest of the world are ruled 
by national governments that try to be “good” to their own 
manufacturers, to have stable money becomes a tough test. It 
resembles a duel of a decent man with the one who is 
treacherous and cheats. And on top of that, your own “anchor” 
is not without sin either. It is baffling, indeed. Luckily, 
Lithuanian manufacturers and traders have survived in this 
struggle. More than that, their competitiveness rests on their 
own capacities rather than injections of continuously devalued 
money. They have prepared to compete in Europe’s and the 
world’s markets much better as compared to those who are 
used to working in the environment of constantly depreciating 
currencies. 
 
Lithuania is bound to renounce the currency board system 
in several years and join the European Monetary Union 
where the central bank is an active player in forming 
monetary policy. Is there any probability that the 
principles of the currency board could be applied to 
policies pursued by the European Central Bank? 
 
The euro is the only anchor currency in all member-states, so 
the principles of the currency board have already been 
implemented, but only with respect to national banks, not the 
European Central Bank. Is there any chance to propose this 
bank linking the euro to any other currency? It sounds like a 
joke, although pegging in currency board arrangements is just a 
mechanical principle, while at the bottom lie constrained 
powers of monetary authorities and non-intervention into the 
market. This is a relevant issue, and there is much to think 
about! After all, there is no such thing as “market interest 
rates” in the world any more, and what we call market interest 
rates here in Lithuania, indeed, is just a derivative of the 
administratively fixed interest rates of the world’s major 
currencies, just small adjustment according to the market. 
Since the time central banks started commanding the money 
market, the market as such has vanished. For this reason the 
gold standard was bound to wane as it had been a roadblock to 
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central bankers’ unrestricted ruling of money, an unhandy 
“harness” of their power.  
 
I think that developments and trends in the currency “market” 
are signalling that tools will be searched to limit government 
interventions and to revert to the market with a genuine non-
administratively set price of money. It wouldn’t matter then 
who would issue money and what their colour would be. It 
would reflect the fundamental phenomena of the economy 
rather than the government. Perhaps the most consequential 
aspect of our “experiment” is that we have preserved money 
protected from government discretion and have witnessed that 
such a leash remains purposeful in the modern age of the man’s 
power.  
 
 
 
*** 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Gitanas Nauseda is considered to be among the most 
vehement opponents of the currency board system. When this 
reform was piloted through the Government and the 
Parliament, Mr. Nauseda worked at the Financial Institutions 
Division of the Bank of Lithuania and voiced his opinion in one 
of the leading national dailies, Lietuvos rytas. Let us take a 
look at how the story of the currency board is viewed by its 
opponent after ten years… 
 
 
A Currency Board was One out of Many Options 
of Monetary Policy 
By Dr. Gitanas Nauseda, Adviser to President, Vilniaus Bankas 
 
“I am against gold fetishism, against unseen passiveness which 
people display by consciously refusing to control the money 
they themselves print and by shifting responsibility to the 
unfeeling international gold standard.” These are not my 
thoughts. These are Keynes’ thoughts laid down in his early 
book “A Tract on Monetary Reform.” However, I would sign 
under these words without reservations. It does not matter that 
they refer not to the present-day currency board but to the gold 
standard. After all, differences between these two are only 
minor. 
 
It is somewhat strange to see people believe that money – the 
creation of their own hands and mind – can best be governed 
only by economic laws independent of their will and 
consciousness. It is my opinion that the best solution is to 
entrust money to specialists who are good at economic laws 
and at the same time to shield the central bank from political 
interference by law. A model like this existed in Germany for 
many decades. It has been successfully applied in the United 
States. Today no one in the United States would even consider 
seriously whether it would be better to have A. Greenspan 
(together with his team capable of smelling an economic 
recession before it actually starts) or automatic rules of the 
game. Naturally, small countries have fewer options because 
they need to pay heed one way or another to strong world 
currencies. But even in this case there are always several 
alternatives. 
  
In order to answer the question whether a currency board was 
the most suitable arrangement for Lithuania in the past decade, 
we would need to test other variants in practice. Unfortunately, 
this is not possible. For example, the central bank of Latvia 
under Repse’s leadership has performed no worse than our 
currency board. But this does not mean that in similar 
circumstances Lithuania would have succeeded in pursuing just 
as an effective monetary policy. It is not only the central bank’s 
governor but also a host of other factors all of which cannot be 
evaluated a priori that determine success. 
 
It has never been my opinion that there is only one optimal 
choice of monetary policy, while all others are bad. Much 
depends not so much on monetary policy per se, but on the 
combination of monetary and fiscal policies (as well as other 
components of economic policy). In this respect monetary 
policy decisions can be divided into very good, good, 
satisfactory, bad and very bad. Although at first I was sceptical 
about currency boards, I think it would be simply unfair to 
label them as either bad solutions or very good solutions. 
 
The currency board as a special monetary system has played no 
small part in stabilizing the Lithuanian economy. Two or three 
years after the currency board had been installed inflation and 
nominal interest rates fell down markedly. In addition to that, 
the currency board has proved to be a fairly good safeguard 
against the government’s expansionary financial policy. Under 
a floating exchange rate regime, fiscal policy errors frequently 
go unnoticed as a reduced exchange rate of the national 
currency against foreign currencies can always be blamed on 
improper decisions of the central bank. Under a fixed exchange 
rate arrangement (under a currency board system) an overly 
generous fiscal policy causes a loss of official foreign reserves 
and an increase in interest rates. When budget expenditures and 
borrowing needs on the domestic market grow and there is no 
possibility to borrow directly from the central bank, the state is 
forced to seek private creditors (banks, insurance companies, 
etc.) who would agree to extend more expensive loans. In 
extreme cases voluntarism in financial policy may “bar” the 
central market to the state altogether and put the state on the 
edge of a financial crisis. We faced a situation like this in the 
second half of 1999, and later on this experience taught our 
politicians a good lesson not to repeat past mistakes. 
 
By denying the central bank the power of discretionary 
regulation of money supply and interest rates, the currency 
board made the central bank an improper target of political 
pressure. Indeed, how could the Parliament or the Government 
force the central bank to cut down interest rates or to “correct” 
the exchange rate or to extend a loan to finance a budget deficit 
if the central bank did not have a right to do so? Lithuanian 
politicians mechanically kept attacking the Bank of Lithuania 
with various requirements with the view to gaining short-term 
political dividends (for example, Prime Minister Gediminas 
Vagnorius advocated the idea of using official foreign reserves 
to stimulate domestic crediting), but after several years they 
perceived the futility of such efforts. 
 
On the other hand, life has shown that a currency board can 
neither protect the banking system from upheavals nor be a 
  OPOSITION 
 9
kind of a substitute for the supervision of credit institutions. 
Quite the contrary. An effective and rigid supervision of a 
banking system is essential for a successful performance of a 
currency board. At the turn of 1996 inadequate control of credit 
institutions (both legitimate and illegitimate) provoked a 
banking crisis during which restrictions imposed by the 
currency board proved to be completely ineffective in putting 
out “the fire.” This forced the authorities to violate the 
principles of a “pure” currency board and to temporarily 
change the rules of the game, i. e. to revoke sanctions applied 
to commercial banks for non-compliance with mandatory 
reserve requirements, to provide liquidity injections for some 
of them and the like. 
 
I think pegging the litas to the US dollar and not the German 
mark, as Estonia did, on 1 April 1994 was a mistake. The 
advocates of the currency board chose a passive approach, 
instead of a pro-active one, towards the choice of the anchor 
currency. They took into account the then obviously dollarised 
foreign trade and composition of loans, deposits and the 
currency market. On the one hand, this reduced the economy’s 
vulnerability to fluctuations in the exchange rate. On the other 
hand, it “conserved” a high degree of dollarisation for a long 
time. Later Lithuania’s integration into the European Union led 
the authorities to break the “conservative” currency board 
system and to re-peg the litas to the euro at the beginning of 
2002. For subjective reasons, i.e. by pegging the litas to the 
euro at the time when the euro’s exchange rate was particularly 
low in relation to the US dollar, this re-pegging was financially 
very painful for the country’s inert deposit holders who 
continued to keep their deposits in US dollars and suffered 
tremendous losses. 
 
When I think about the currency board’s mission and 
Lithuania’s upcoming membership of the European Union and 
the European Monetary Union, I recall an old maxim “the 
Moor has done his job, the Moor can go.” We intend to join the 
EU common currency space which champions discretionary 
monetary policy and an active central bank. There is some 
merit of the currency board in that Lithuania stands out from 
among Central and Eastern European countries as fairly well-
prepared for financial integration. Unlike for many other 
acceding countries, for Lithuanian business a fixed exchange 
rate is not a new status quo but a customary and familiar 
condition of doing business.   
 
 
 
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Sigitas Siaudinis is Head of the Monetary Policy Division 
of the Bank of Lithuania, Ph.D. He has studied the operation of 
the world’s currency board arrangements and has defended a 
doctoral dissertation on this topic at Vilnius University. Ten 
years ago Mr. Siaudinis was among the many opponents of the 
currency board system but later changed his opinion. 
 
 
Changing Attitudes towards Modern-day 
Currency Boards During Ten Years of a 
Currency Board in Lithuania 
By Dr. Sigitas Siaudinis*, Bank of Lithuania 
 
 
Lithuania’s currency board is entering its tenth anniversary at a 
time when the country’s economy has shown a robust growth 
for several years now. The country also meets all of the 
Maastricht criteria applied to EU member-states that wish to 
join the euro area. Most Lithuanian and foreign experts as well 
as the society uphold Lithuania’s goal and possibilities to retain 
the present exchange rate of the litas and the currency board 
both when Lithuania joins the Exchange Rate Mechanism II 
(ERM II) (the interim phase required by the European Union to 
assess a country’s readiness for membership of the euro area) 
and participates in ERM II until membership of the European 
Monetary Union. However, currency boards in Lithuania and 
elsewhere have not always enjoyed such friendly attitudes. In 
fact, these attitudes have changed significantly over the past ten 
years.  
 
Lithuania adopted a currency board in the last decade of the 
past century, during this model’s Renaissance. Three years 
earlier (in 1991) a currency board arrangement was installed in 
Argentina. In 1992 Estonia launched one, and in the third year 
of Lithuania’s currency board, this model was implemented in 
Bulgaria and Bosnia. 
 
At that time the opinion among the academics and monetary 
policy executives prevailed that a currency board was a 
suitable mechanism for quickly stabilising the currency of a 
developing country and gaining confidence in it (the latter 
motive prevailed when a currency board was being 
implemented in Lithuania, where hyperinflation had been 
overcome before the currency board was introduced). Many 
thought that currency boards would not be stable regimes 
because the economy had a limited degree of flexibility, as the 
common view was, in reacting to stronger external shocks, the 
authorities lacked determination to enhance this flexibility by 
pursuing structural reforms and commitment to rigid fiscal 
policy and because there was a growing likelihood of a 
liquidity crisis in a naturally developing financial sector. 
                                                 
* The author’s fields of activity: implementation of monetary 
policy and money market. The author’s views expressed in the 
article do not necessarily represent those of the Bank of 
Lithuania 
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Therefore, a currency board could be just a temporary “shield” 
in active preparations for a more flexible monetary policy or 
for joining a suitable monetary union (if such existed), while a 
sudden collapse would have been very painful (for more see R. 
Kopcke (1999)). 
 
During the first years after the adoption of a currency board in 
Lithuania, the country’s membership of the European Union, 
not to mention the then springing European Monetary Union, 
looked distant and uncertain. For many, the revival of our 
economy seemed too slow, and the young financial system 
experienced quite a few bank failures and a systemic crisis at 
the end of 1995. In such circumstances the new ruling rightist 
majority (the autumn of 1996), supported by many prominent 
Lithuanian economists (including central bank economists), 
adopted a plan for a gradual exit from the currency board 
arrangement. This plan was spelled out in “Monetary Policy 
Programme of the Bank of Lithuania for 1997-1999.” As 
markets predicted depreciation of the litas, interest rates 
remained high until 2001 although the average annual inflation 
rate fell to a one-digit figure in 1997 and has stood below 2 
percent since 1999. 
 
Ironically, when the Russian crisis severely injured the 
Lithuanian economy in 1999, the plans to abandon the currency 
board, which until then had been considered an inflexible 
regime that impeded proper reaction to changing economic 
conditions, were postponed. At that time the official obligation 
to retain the currency board arrangement for some time and to 
tighten up fiscal policy, which the government of Lithuania 
assumed towards IMF while negotiating the renewal of the 
Stabilization Programme, made it possible to avoid insolvency 
with the help of foreign loans drawn in 1999. (The agreement 
with IMF was formally signed in March 2000, i.e. after the 
critical period for government finances had been overcome). 
 
When the second-generation currency boards proved their 
vitality and collected longer time series of economic data, 
prominent experts announced research studies showing the 
effectiveness of currency boards as long-term strategies (A. 
Ghosh (1998); A. Gulde (2000); L. Batiz (2000)). Following 
international discussions in 1998 and 1999, EU institutions 
officially announced in 2000 that a country with a currency 
board arrangement would be able to join ERM II and prepare 
for membership of the euro area (the ECB president declared 
this position in April 2000; the European Council announced 
special statement  in Nice, December 2000). At the same time 
EU authorities emphasized that a currency board would be a 
unilateral commitment on the part of its home country to 
comply with a stricter regime than required by ERM II. 
Country’s possibility to maintain a fixed exchange rate and a 
currency board was to be considered individually in accordance 
with general procedures of multilateral negotiations by 
evaluating this model’s stability and suitability for the 
country’s convergence with the economic nucleus of the euro 
area.  
 
Three out of the four best known and currently functioning 
currency boards are in countries seeking membership of the 
European Union and the euro area. These are Bulgaria, Estonia 
and Lithuania. These countries are planning to preserve their 
currency board arrangements until they join the euro area. 
 
Lithuania’s clear aspiration to join this monetary union, the 
expected not too distant accession into the union, a competitive 
economy, fiscal discipline, a fairly healthy and undeveloped 
banking system (the low risk of a liquidity crisis in the case of 
the contraction of money demand), an objectively small 
internal financial market (the little space for speculative 
attacks), obligations towards EU institutions to proceed with 
structural reforms in order to increase the economy’s flexibility 
– a combination of all these factors have markedly increased 
confidence in the country’s currency board system so that even 
conceptual critics of this exchange rate regime have recognized 
its success. 
 
The level of real income (GDP in PPP per capita) and prices in 
Lithuania are slowly converging towards the richer EU 
countries but now it constitutes only 40 to 50 percent of the 
euro area average. Therefore, despite a long period of higher 
inflation, the real exchange rate of the litas remains 
considerably undervalued. In terms of the exchange rate, 
Lithuania has a long way to go to a long-term equilibrium 
towards which it is gradually converging. However, Lithuania 
does not stand out in the trajectory of the current and acceding 
EU member-states in terms of the real income and price level. 
 
Under such circumstances it would be difficult to prove that a 
different exchange rate regime would be better and negative 
consequences of its replacement would be too obvious. The 
opponents of the currency board in Lithuania did not offer any 
convincing alternative exchange rate mechanism. They did not 
dispel the doubts regarding its transparency either.  
 
Hong Kong’s currency board has faced much bigger challenges 
than the future EU member-states. In the light of accelerating 
integration with the Chinese economy, whose price level is 
several times lower than that in Hong Kong, Hong Kong’s 
economy has experienced a prolonged deflationary downturn. 
At the same time plans of a monetary union are not being 
contemplated due to the existing enormous economic 
differences and limited convertibility of the Chinese currency. 
Nevertheless, both Chinese and Hong Kong authorities as well 
as prominent economists are of the opinion that it would be 
most beneficial to maintain the present exchange rate regime 
and to achieve more flexibility of the real economy.  
 
The differences between the instruments of day-by-day 
implementation  of a currency boards and the Eurosystem’s 
monetary policy (i.e. differences in their operational 
frameworks) are obvious.  They have been frequently 
emphasized by the opponents of the currency board. However, 
the trends of liquidity management of the banking system in 
the euro area show that this is not going to be a serious obstacle 
for countries with currency boards.  
 
Since the monetary union came into being, large banks in the 
euro area have extended their liquidity management to the 
international euro market and have increasingly centralized 
management of their financial group’s treasury. Small and 
medium-sized banks, like those in Lithuania, have increasingly 
orientated their activities towards the domestic market and in 
most cases managed their liquidity through transactions with 
the aforesaid international banks. The number of credit 
institutions directly participating in the monetary policy 
operations of the euro system and competing on the 
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international scale has decreased to 4 or 5 percent of potential 
participants (institutions which are subject to the minimum 
reserve requirements applied by the ECB). So the interbank 
euro market is becoming increasingly important in 
redistributing bank reserves in the euro area not only 
domestically but also on the international scale. A currency 
board mechanism provides natural incentives for domestic 
banks to actively operate in this market in managing their 
liquidity. 
 
When modern-day currency boards were being implemented, 
they were compared with their successful predecessors, the 
first generation (orthodox) currency boards which functioned 
in more than 70 colonies from the middle of the 19th century 
until the first half of the 20th century. The advocates and 
opponents of the currency board use the differences between 
these generations to support their arguments. The advocates of 
the orthodox model reproachfully note that the institutions 
implementing modern-day currency boards (usually central 
banks) have maintained some additional monetary policy 
instruments and the functions of banking supervision and a 
lender of last resort, and that they can thus distort self-
regulation of the money supply and injure the long-term 
macroeconomic stability. The opponents contrarily emphasize 
that currency boards functioning in the modern financial 
markets should be more flexible as they are not flexible 
enough. Most advocates and opponents agree that modern-day 
models are not pure currency boards but rather quasi-
substitutes. 
 
Publications analyzing the peculiarities of currency boards and 
justifying this arrangement appeared at the close of the last 
decade of twentieth century (C. Ho (2000). However, this topic 
was not yet profoundly analysed, most likely because the 
second-generation currency boards also ensure self-regulation 
of money supply. So the main question revolved around the 
choice between a currency board and more flexible exchange 
rate regimes.  
 
It would be difficult to prove that the collapse of the currency 
board in Argentina (in 2001) was caused by its deviations from 
the orthodox standard rather than by fundamental factors, such 
as the appreciation of the anchor currency against the main 
trade partners, many years of wasteful fiscal policy, inflexible 
labour market, monopolized economy and inability to tighten 
up economic policies in the face of a crisis. 
  
Still, a closer look at the circumstances under which modern-
day currency boards are functioning and at their general 
features distinguishing them both from the orthodox model and 
other fixed exchange rate regimes of today makes it possible to 
avoid many disputes. 
 
Orthodox currency boards were a handy mechanism for 
colonies in transforming the currency of the metropolis for 
local use. The central bank of the metropolis performed the 
functions of banking supervision and a lender of last resort to 
the banks whose branches composed the banking systems in 
the colonies. 
 
The modern-day currency boards are in most cases chosen by 
independent states. These models are also based on self-
regulation of money supply, but they bear more responsibility 
than their predecessors for preserving the stability of the 
banking system. They are also operating under conditions of 
much more sophisticated financial markets and more mobile 
capital movements. In addition to the features of the orthodox 
model (free capital movements, a fixed exchange rate 
established by law and automatic buying and selling of the 
anchor currency), they have the following peculiarities: 
 
1. The legal requirements of backing the national currency with 
the anchor currency reserves are less strict: the requirement is 
to back only part of the central bank’s liabilities (the money 
base, as in Argentina), liabilities in national currency (Estonia 
and Lithuania) with general and not net international reserves. 
Such milder requirements were determined by the established 
backing of the central bank’s liabilities before the currency 
board was introduced and a wish to maintain the function of a 
lender of last resort in the case of systemic banking crises 
whose likelihood was particularly high at the beginning of 
financial stabilization. The qualitative change in adopting 
currency boards was not in complete backing but in a switch to 
automatic money supply tied to the dynamics of the balance of 
payments. It should be noted that reinvesting part of the profit 
earned with foreign assets allowed many of the long-standing 
currency boards (including those in Estonia, Hong Kong and 
Lithuania) to reach the orthodox standard – an excess of the 
central bank’s net foreign reserves over all of its domestic 
liabilities. 
 
2. The operating of first-generation currency boards was 
usually limited to the exchange  of notes and coins. Currency 
boards functioning in the modern financial markets implement 
a faster and cheaper way for self-regulation of money supply.  
Exchange  in non-cash form prevails. The main counterparties 
of the central banks as well as in the cases of the other modern 
exchange rate regimes are local banks which effectively 
indicate the net money demand of the economy. Not 
accidentally central banks organize the systems of interbank 
settlements and integrate them closely with the mechanism of 
the money supply self-regulation. The central banks in 
Bulgaria and Lithuania also directly exchange currency for 
government institutions. This frequently causes additional 
liquidity fluctuations in the banking system and “switches on” 
the self-regulating mechanism –exchange transactions between 
banks and the central bank.  
 
3. By using additional monetary policy instruments, central 
banks implementing modern-day currency boards aim to 
maintain a buffer of the banking system’s liquidity which 
banks are required to form without borrowing from the central 
bank and which makes the self-regulating mechanism more 
stable in periods of short-term fluctuations in money demand. 
The central banks in Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania apply 
minimum reserve requirements in this case, whereas the Hong 
Kong monetary authority forms an analogous buffer by issuing 
its debt securities among the banks. Previously the central 
banks in Estonia (from 1993 until 2000) and Lithuania (from 
1997 until 2000) also conducted open-market operations to 
smooth liquidity fluctuations in the banking system. These 
disputable operations were forgone after banks had developed 
possibilities of liquidity management in domestic and 
international markets. 
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4. Comparison of modern-day currency boards with other fixed 
exchange rate regimes shows that actual backing is not a 
universal distinctive feature. In the last decade before 
membership of the euro area, the orthodox backing total 
domestic liabilities of the Austrian central bank was positive 
and bigger not only than that in Lithuania, but also than the 
Estonian backing in recent years. The analogous coverage in 
the Netherlands (prior to the monetary union) and in Latvia (at 
the present moment) is below 100 percent but exceeds the 
Bulgarian level. The most essential difference in these 
exchange rate regimes is reflected in the monetary policy 
instruments that the central banks regularly apply. Currency 
boards are traditionally based on self-regulation of money 
supply (on buying and selling of the anchor currency as 
initiated by commercial banks). Under other fixed exchange 
rate arrangements central banks seek equilibrium first of all 
with the help of open-market operations designed to maintain a 
level of interest rates on the money market corresponding to a 
fixed exchange rate. They carry out currency interventions in 
the second “defence echelon” of the exchange rate, but at the 
same time they tolerate bigger exchange rate fluctuations in the 
market around the official fixed exchange rate than currency 
boards do. 
 
In generalising the peculiarities of the second-generation 
currency boards, we can say that these peculiarities stem from 
the aim to  ensure the self-regulating mechanism of money 
supply in the environment of modern financial markets. For 
this reason the modern-day currency boards should not be 
labelled with a prefix “quasi.” 
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Mr. Kurt Schuler is Senior Economist to the Vice Chairman of 
the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress. More than 
a decade ago he and other prominent economists took an 
active part in making the case for the currency board reform in 
Lithuania. In the following article Mr. Schuler gives 
reminiscences on how the Law on Litas Credibility, which 
established the currency board system in Lithuania, saw the 
day-light in the country. 
 
 
A Reminiscence on the Origins of the Law on 
Litas Credibility 
By Kurt Schuler  
 
The ideas ultimately embodied in the Law on Litas Credibility 
of April 1, 1994 began with a visit by a delegation of 
Lithuanian government officials and others to the United States 
in April 1990. The group was gathering ideas potentially useful 
for advancing Lithuania’s economy and the cause of 
independence from the Soviet Union. The delegation visited 
George Mason University in Virginia, where I was a graduate 
student in economics. I was unable to meet with the group that 
day, but I wrote a short memorandum suggesting that the 
simplicity and robustness of a currency board would make it a 
good monetary system for an independent Lithuania. The 
memorandum was later translated into Lithuanian and 
published in the newspaper Permainos. 
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The delegation also visited Hillsdale College in Michigan. 
Coincidentally, the college was hosting a conference of 
economists of the Austrian School of economic thought. 
Among the participants was George Selgin, then an assistant 
professor at the University of Georgia. Selgin talked to the 
group and also suggested a currency board as an appropriate 
monetary system. 
 
Hearing a currency board proposed independently by two 
people made a sufficiently strong impression on the delegation 
that in the summer of 1990 Selgin and I were invited to visit 
Lithuania. What the delegation did not know was that perhaps 
only half a dozen people in the United States knew much about 
currency boards at the time. Selgin and I were both influenced 
by our study of Hong Kong. In 1987, when he was an assistant 
professor at George Mason University, Selgin had received a 
fellowship from the mutual fund company G.T. Management. 
The fellowship paid the expenses of summer study in Hong 
Kong under the guidance of the firm’s chief economist, John 
Greenwood. During the 1988-89 academic years Selgin 
returned to Hong Kong as a lecturer at the University of Hong 
Kong. In 1989, I received the G.T. Management summer 
fellowship. John Greenwood was then, as he remains today, 
probably the most knowledgeable person about Hong Kong’s 
somewhat peculiar version of a currency board. He had been 
instrumental in returning Hong Kong to the currency board 
system in 1983, as a way of ending a severe currency crisis. 
 
During the summer of 1990, Selgin arranged financing for our 
trip from the George Edward Durrell Foundation, an 
organization devoted to the study of monetary questions, and 
the Atlas Economic Research Foundation. Together, we wrote 
a draft paper containing ideas on monetary reform as well as 
some other topics. I presented it to a seminar at George Mason 
University, while Selgin solicited comments from a few 
economists around the United States. Milton Friedman gave a 
characteristic reply, politely but firmly pointing out some 
defects with the draft. 
 
We visited Vilnius in late October 1990 for a week or so as 
guests of the Bank for Industry and Construction 
(Promstroibank). We met with a number of officials, including 
the bank’s president, Romualdas Visokavicius (later president 
of the Bank of Lithuania); the Prime Minister, Kazimiera 
Prunskiene; and the Chairman of the Supreme Council, 
Vytautas Landsbergis. George Selgin also spoke at the Institute 
of Economic Science. We were helped during our visit by Mr. 
Visokavicius, his wife, and a small group of other persons that 
included Kestutis Glaveckas, Elena Leontjeva, Petras 
Austrevicius, Vytenis Aleskaitis, and Remigijus Bartaska. The 
first three members of this group would later found the 
Lithuanian Free Market Institute (LFMI). 
 
My impression of the centrally planned Soviet economy was 
that upon close inspection almost everything was shoddy and 
second-rate. The stores had displayed in the window but few 
goods on the shelf; restaurants had extensive menus but only 
actually served a few dishes, usually not prepared well; large 
apartment buildings had no sidewalks connecting them and no 
working elevators. The system was rotten, but most 
Lithuanians knew it was rotten, and they were preparing for the 
day they would no longer have to live under it. However, 
because the Soviet system had so long isolated Lithuania, the 
economic ideas of policymakers were heavily influenced by 
Soviet examples. We considered it a bad idea simply to imitate 
the Soviet central bank, for instance, with a Lithuanian central 
bank based on similar principles, and we expressed our doubts 
in an interview with the newspaper Respublika. 
 
After returning to the United States, Selgin and I used the 
balance-sheet data and other information about the workings of 
the monetary system that we had gathered during our trip to 
refine our earlier ideas. The resulting paper that was, I believe, 
the first detailed proposal for a currency board in any centrally 
planned economy. We explained how Lithuania might generate 
the foreign reserves for a currency board. We suggested that 
the most appropriate anchor currency would be the German 
mark, since after Soviet rule ended, Lithuania’s trade would 
turn increasingly toward Western Europe. Finally, we proposed 
how to handle some potential problems with the banking 
system. 
 
We could not get our proposal published in the United States 
because it seemed too novel at the time. It was, however, 
translated into Lithuanian and circulated in Vilnius in 
photocopied form. We did not know then but later found out 
that another American economist, Joe Cobb, also 
recommended a currency board as a possibility for establishing 
an independent currency in Lithuania at a conference in Vilnius 
in November 1990. In March 1991, Prime Minister Gediminas 
Vagnorius invited us to follow up our previous visit, apparently 
as a result of reading our proposal. On our second trip, Mr. 
Vagnorius requested George Selgin to return to Lithuania and 
to bring colleagues if Selgin wished. Selgin therefore asked 
Joseph Sinkey, Jr., a professor of finance at the University of 
Georgia, and me to accompany him. Sinkey was the author of 
an authoritative and widely used textbook on the financial 
management of commercial banks. We arrived in Vilnius on 
July 30 and stayed a little more than a week. During our visit 
we were again helped by some of the same people who had 
been so hospitable the previous year, especially Elena 
Leontjeva. Ruta Vitkeviciute (now Vainiene) served as our 
translator on a few occasions. 
 
Our impression from talking to government officials and 
observing the policies the Lithuanian government was enacting 
was that, as in 1990, the government and people knew central 
planning did not work, but lacked a clear alternative vision. 
The Bank of Lithuania was just translating Soviet regulations 
into Lithuanian and enforcing them. It had no plan for making 
an independent Lithuanian currency convertible. Its officials 
refused to meet with us. We expressed our scepticism of the 
bank’s policy and of the coupon rationing scheme that had 
recently begun. After returning to the United States, we wrote a 
paper summarizing our ideas, which was published by the Cato 
Institute in Washington. 
 
The Soviet Union ended sooner than we dared hope. The 
abortive coup against President Mikhail Gorbachev occurred 
later in August 1991 and Russia recognized Lithuania’s 
independence in early September. Given the opportunity to 
pursue a monetary policy different from that of the Soviet 
Union, though, Lithuania did not establish a currency board. A 
central bank had support both within Lithuania and from the 
International Monetary Fund, which only had a few staff who 
knew much about currency boards. At a conference in 
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Indianapolis, Indiana in October 1991, sponsored by a group 
called the International Baltic Commission, two IMF officials 
told me they thought currency boards were not appropriate and 
not likely for the Baltic States. 
 
In June 1992 Estonia established a currency board-like 
monetary system - not an orthodox currency board, but a 
combination of currency board and central banking elements. 
The Estonian system was influenced by a short book that I 
wrote with Steve Hanke and Lars Jonung. Jonung, who 
suggested the project, was at the time chief economic adviser 
to the prime minister of Sweden. As such, he was involved in 
Sweden’s effort to help its Baltic neighbours in their transition 
to a market economy. Hanke was (and still is) a professor of 
applied economics at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, 
Maryland. He had learned about currency boards from Sir Alan 
Walters, a fellow professor and sometime economic adviser to 
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. I had begun 
working with Hanke in the summer of 1990 because of our 
shared interest in currency boards. Hanke visited Estonia in 
May 1992 to discuss the currency board idea with members of 
the Estonian parliament. Jonung also visited Estonia and had 
contact with Estonian government officials and economists. 
 
The success of Estonia’s monetary reform combined with some 
problems under the original monetary policy of the Bank of 
Lithuania allowed creating renewed interest in a currency 
board. Without the untiring efforts of LFMI the idea of a 
currency board would not have received a second chance. The 
institute, especially Elena Leontjeva, wrote and talked 
frequently about the idea to many different audiences. When 
the time came that the idea was ripe to be reconsidered, LFMI 
asked Steve Hanke and me to write a short book as we had 
done in the case of Estonia. It was translated by Ruta Vainiene 
and published in February 1994. Like the proposal Selgin and I 
had made, it suggested that the German mark would be the 
most appropriate anchor currency. 
 
During the debate about reforming the Bank of Lithuania’s 
monetary policy, Steve Hanke visited Lithuania. He received 
an appointment as an official but unpaid economic adviser to 
President Algirdas Brazauskas and kept in contact with the 
president’s office during the time the Law on Litas Credibility 
was being drafted. I had frequent opportunities to watch the 
progress of the drafting while working with Hanke in his office 
as he received frequent faxes and telephone calls from Vilnius. 
Hanke and I advocated an orthodox currency board. LFMI 
gave valuable support and advice to Hanke on the politics 
involved. Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius seemed inclined 
in our favour, but the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of 
Lithuania, and the resident representative of the International 
Monetary Fund were opposed, and tried to retain as much 
discretionary power for the Bank of Lithuania as they could. 
The final result was a currency board-like system somewhat 
like that of Estonia. 
 
In many writings, such as a 1993 book proposing a currency 
board for Russia, Hanke and I have warned of the dangers of 
currency board-like systems. They contain incompatible 
elements, because the discretionary power characteristic of a 
central bank is opposed to the rules characteristic of a currency 
board. The problem is one of economic logic as well as 
politics. Argentina’s currency board-like system came to a bad 
end in January 2002. Lithuania’s system endured strains in 
during the banking crisis of 1995 and again after Russia’s 
financial crisis of 1998. Fortunately, the government chose to 
adhere mainly to the discipline fostered by the exchange rate 
rather than to follow the more typical central banking path of 
devaluation. Again, the Free Market Institute played a key role, 
by making the case to the government and the public not to 
return to the policies that had already been tried before 1994 
and been unsatisfactory. 
 
The exchange rate of 4 litas per U.S. dollar survived. The 
switch from the U.S. dollar to the euro as the anchor on 
February 2, 2002 in a sense fulfilled the recommendations 
Selgin, Hanke and I had made years earlier to use the German 
mark. Lithuania will soon become part of the European Union, 
and it is on track to become a member of the European Central 
Bank with fewer exchange-rate problems that Poland, for 
example, may experience because of the difficulty a “pure” 
central bank has in maintaining a pegged exchange rate. The 
Law on Litas Credibility, while not perfect, was considerably 
better than the policy it replaced, and over the last ten years it 
has helped Lithuania develop into an increasingly prosperous 
market economy. 
 
The ideas expressed in the article represent his personal views 
only.  
 
References 
 
Cobb, Joe. 1990. “The True Achievement of State Sovereignty: 
A Currency for Lithuania.” Unpublished paper presented 
at a conference in Vilnius, November 28. 
Godunavičiaus, Arūno. 1990. “Nepritariame jūsų banko 
reformai.” Respublika, 26 October, p. 2. 
Hanke, Steve H., Lars Jonung, and Kurt Schuler. 1992. 
Monetary Reform for a Free Estonia: A Currency Board 
Solution. Stockholm: SNS Förlag. Estonian translation by 
Avo Viiol Rahareform vabale eestile: valuutafondi 
lahendus. Tartu, Estonia: Tartu Ülikool, 1992. 
Hanke, Steve H., and Kurt Schuler. 1993. Russian Currency 
and Finance: A Currency Board Approach to Reform. 
London: Routledge. 
Hanke, Steve H., and Kurt Schuler. 1994. Valiutų taryba: 
pasiūlymai Lietuvai. Translated by Rūta Vainienė. Vilnius: 
Lietuvos laisvosios rinkos institutas. 
Schuler, Kurt. 1990. “Litas nereikalingas iš viso.” [Translated 
by Vytennis Aleškaitis.] Permainos, September. 
Schuler, Kurt 1991. “Currency Board System Urged.” Durrell 
Journal of Money and Banking, v. 3, no. 1, February, pp. 
30-1. 
Schuler, Kurt, George Selgin, and Joseph Sinkey, Jr.1991. 
“Replacing the Rubble in Lithuania: Real Change versus 
Pseudoreform.” Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 163, 28 
October. http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-163.html  
Selgin, George A. 1991. “Questing for Currency Reform in 
Lithuania.” Durrell Journal of Money and Banking, v. 3, 
no. 1, February, pp. 30-1. 
Selgin, George A., and Kurt Schuler. 1990b.“Memorandum on 
Lithuanian Currency Reform.” Proposal submitted to the 
president and prime minister of Lithuania, November 
1990. 
 
 15
 
Investment Climate Survey 
 
The Lithuanian Free Market Institute is conducting an 
Investment Climate Survey which is aimed at generating 
establishment-level quantitative information that would help 
evaluate the performance of business enterprises and identify 
constraints to doing business. The survey was contracted by the 
World Bank and will be completed by 1st of May, 2004.  
 
The survey is designed to provide firm level evidence on the 
impact of a wide range of policy reforms on business 
performance and the state of investment climate in Lithuania. 
The data from this survey will be compared with information 
from the World Bank’s recent surveys to benchmark the 
competitiveness of the Lithuanian private sector against major 
competitor countries. The survey is tailored to be repeated in 3-
5 years to assess the impact of government policies on private 
sector growth and productivity increases.  
 
This survey will be the foundation of an Investment Climate 
Assessment which will be written by the World Bank’s Europe 
and Central Asia Private Sector Development group.  
 
*** 
 
 
 
LFMI receives a Templeton Freedom Award 
 
March 15, 2004 - The Lithuanian Free Market Institute (LFMI) 
has been awarded a prize of the Templeton Freedom Awards 
Program given in the category of Institute Excellence. Three 
institutes from The Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Serbia & 
Montenegro were other organisations from Eastern Europe 
which were granted the same award. Over 140 institutes from 
more than 50 countries took part in the Templeton Freedom 
Awards Program.  
 
Supported and named after the pioneer of international 
investing, Sir John Templeton, the program rewards innovative 
and outstanding work of think tanks in countries throughout the 
world that promote the ideas of freedom. The Templeton 
Freedom Awards Program was launched in September 2003 
with a four-year pledge from the John Templeton Foundation.  
 
The Programme is directed by the U.S. Atlas Economic 
Research Foundation. Since 1981, this foundation has been the 
leading international organization for supporting independent 
think tanks advancing freedom.  
 
LFMI has already received one prize from the John Templeton 
Foundation. In 2001 LFMI became a winner of the Sir John 
Templeton Foundation’s International Freedom Project, 
directed by the Atlas Economic Research Foundation. LFMI 
has been awarded a grant for a semester-long course 
„Individual, Society, Freedom, Market.” LFMI’s fellow 
workers have been giving this course in Lithuanian universities 
for four years now. 
  
 
The goals of the Lisbon agenda are hardly 
compatible, says LFMI 
LFMI has analysed the Lisbon strategy and developed a 
comprehensive study on its impact on Lithuania  
 
January 29, 2004, VILNIUS (Lithuania)  – The core goals and 
objectives of the Lisbon strategy are not entirely coherent and 
can hardly be compatible, reported the Lithuanian Free Market 
Institute (LFMI), a private think-tank in Lithuania, after it has 
evaluated the Lisbon strategy and made an in-depth study on its 
impact on Lithuania and identified priorities for the country.  
 
LFMI concluded that attempts are made to combine two 
different goals in the Lisbon agenda - to create conditions for 
economic growth and increased competitiveness, and at the 
same time to promote social benefits and social cohesion. 
LFMI also pointed out that some policy measures, currently 
being undertaken in Lithuania with regard to the country’s 
membership of the European Union, run counter to the 
recommendations set in the Lisbon agenda.  
 
LFMI is the first and, so far, the only institution in Lithuania 
which has undertook a thorough analysis of the Lisbon 
strategy. The study presents not only the Lisbon strategy, but 
also a detailed evaluation of Lithuania’s priorities in reaching 
its targets and policy recommendations for relevant state 
institutions in Lithuania. The study discusses more specifically 
the goals and priorities laid down in the Lisbon agenda in the 
areas of entrepreneurship, employment, macroeconomic policy, 
education, health care, social cohesion and sustainable 
development.  
 
The importance of the Lisbon strategy on the EU agenda and 
its relevance to Lithuania encouraged LFMI to take up this 
initiative. LFMI highlights that discrepancies between policy 
measures taken in Lithuania and the Lisbon goals are the 
primary reasons why Lithuania should have clear and 
articulated priorities. This analysis may well be considered the 
first framing of Lithuania’s priorities of social and economic 
policy in the EU, as well as the basis for representing 
Lithuania’s economic interests.  
 
The study will be widely disseminated among the decision 
makers and the society in Lithuania. It has been contracted by 
the European Committee under the Government of Lithuania 
and co-financed by the local pre-accession assistance program 
of Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The English summary 
of the LFMI’s study can be downloaded on LFMI’s website at: 
http://www.freema.org/Projects/Lisbon.phtml.  
 
LFMI has been analysing issues of Lithuania’s integration into 
the EU since 1998. It has conducted a number of impact 
assessment projects on the impact of EU accession on the road 
haulage, sea cargo, the energy and chemical industries in 
Lithuania, and an analysis of an overall impact of the EU 
membership on Lithuania’s economy. In co-operation with 
foreign partners, LFMI has staged several international 
conferences about the consequences of the EU membership on 
candidate countries’ economies and has taken an active role in 
the debates on the EU referendum in Lithuania. LFMI has also 
conducted a study about the future of Europe presenting 
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Lithuania’s point of view concerning the reform of the EU and 
its institutions.  
 
About the Lisbon strategy  
The Lisbon strategy was adopted in 2000 at the summit of the 
European Union in Lisbon. Its ultimate goal is to attain that 
within a decade the European Union becomes “the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the 
world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and 
better jobs and greater social cohesion.” The basic motive to 
adopt this strategy was the EU’s ambition to give fresh impetus 
to its lagging economy and to catch up with the US economy. 
Equally important was the EU’s effort to bring together the EU 
member states for a new project by setting concrete guidelines 
and targets to be reached by co-ordinating economic policies of 
individual countries.  
 
The implementation of the Lisbon strategy is currently among 
the main issues on the EU’s economic policy agenda. Lithuania 
and other accessing countries joined the implementation 
process of the Lisbon strategy in 2003 and will meet with the 
EU member states to discuss the achieved progress in March 
this year.  
 
About LFMI  
The Lithuanian Free Market Institute (LFMI) is a private, non-
profit and non-political organisation established in 1990 to 
advance the ideas of individual freedom and responsibility, free 
market and limited government. The Institute’s team pursues 
its mission by conducting research on key issues of public 
policy, developing conceptual reform packages, drafting and 
evaluating legislative proposals, submitting policy 
recommendations at the legislative and executive levels, and 
conducting educational work in Lithuania. LFMI’s activities 
also include sociological surveys, publications, conferences, 
workshops, and lectures.  
 
Since its inception, LFMI has addressed a variety of core issues 
confronting the reform process. Not only has LFMI helped set 
the terms of debates but has also played a key role in helping to 
craft and refine legislative proposals. LFMI led the creation of 
the legal and institutional foundation for the capital market, a 
currency board system enshrined in the Law on Litas 
Credibility and sound operational principles and financial 
disclosure of commercial banks. LFMI formulated a proposal 
for tax and budget reform that improved the official policy as 
well as prepared the foundations for private pension insurance 
and the Law on Pension Funds. A profound impact was exerted 
on company, bankruptcy and competition law. LFMI has also 
initiated and provided a decisive input to national Sunset and 
Sunrise programmes aimed at sizing down bureaucracy and 
reducing business regulation. One of the basic priority areas of 
LFMI’s research has been the European Union’s impact on the 
economy and the life of people in Lithuania.  
 
LFMI receives financial support from individuals, corporations 
and foundations. LFMI receives financial support from 
individuals, corporations and foundations. Devoted to the 
principles of private ownership, LFMI accepts no funds from 
the Lithuanian government. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Free Market is a quarterly newsletter of the 
Lithuanian Free Market Institute, disseminated in 
electronic form for free. 
 
Sign-up for our free newsletter! 
 
To receive The free Market, please send your name and 
e-mail address at Asta@freema.org.  
 
The Free Market is posted on-line at 
www.freema.org/NewsLetter/index.phtml. 
 
Please e-mail your questions and comments at 
Asta@freema.org. 
 
© LFMI, 1996 - 2002. All rights reserved. Reproduction 
of articles is permitted, provided credit is given and 
copy of the reprinted material is sent to LFMI. To 
request permission to reprint The Free Market articles, 
please call (370-5) 272 4241 or e-mail 
Asta@freema.org.  
 
*** 
The Free Market is published by the Lithuanian Free 
Market Institute – an independent non-profit 
organisation established in 1990 to advance the ideas of 
individual freedom and responsibility, free market and 
limited government. Our motto is 
 
If you don't create a free market, a black market will 
emerge 
 
The founders of LFMI are – Prof. Kęstutis Glaveckas, 
Nijolė Žambaitė, Dainius Pupkevičius, Petras 
Auštrevičius, Elena Leontjeva and Darius Mockus. 
 
LFMI pursues its mission by conducting research on 
key economic policy issues, developing conceptual 
reform packages, submitting policy recommendations at 
the legislative and executive levels, drafting and 
evaluating legislation, and launching public campaigns. 
LFMI‘s activities also include sociological surveys, 
publications, conferences, workshops, and lectures.   
 
LFMI receives financial support from individuals, 
corporations and foundations. Devoted to the principles 
of private ownership, LFMI accepts no funds form the 
Lithuanian government. 
 
Our address: 
Lithuanian Free Market Institute 
Birutės St. 56 
2004 Vilnius 
Lithuania 
Tel. (370-5) 272 2584, (370-5) 272 4241 
Fax (370-5) 272 1279 
www.freema.org (English) 
www.lrinka.lt (Lithuanian)  
